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Abstract 
Financing research and development (R&D) through loans is usually a costly endeavor. 
Information asymmetry, outcome uncertainty and low collateral value tend to increase the 
cost of debt. Based on a large panel of heterogeneous firms, this study shows that recipients of 
public R&D grants, on average, face lower costs of debt. The findings also suggest that a 
process of certification in which the subsidy signals the quality of the firm’s R&D to external 
lenders rather than a ‘resource effect’, i.e. the direct liquidity impact of the subsidy, explains 
this observation. The comparison between young and established firms shows that the 
certification effect for young firms primarily stems from subsidies for basic research, that is, 
for the stage of R&D in which outcome uncertainty and information asymmetries are typically 
larger. In addition, young firms seem to benefit from a ‘formation effect’ through learning 
from the subsidy application process. Application experience may improve young firms’ 
R&D project plans in a way that reduces information asymmetries between firms and lenders.  
Keywords: Innovation policy, Research & Development, R&D subsidies, cost of debt, financial 
constraints 
JEL codes: O31, O38, G30 
Author contact details: 
Sarah Demeulemeester
 
(Corresponding author), KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and 
Innovation, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. E-mail: sarah.demeulemeester@kuleuven.be 
Hanna Hottenrott, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf, 
Universitätsstrasse 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. E-mail: hottenrott@dice.hhu.de 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the Centre for R&D Monitoring (ECOOM) at KU Leuven for access to the R&D survey data and IWT 
for providing the subsidy data. We are grateful to Dirk Czarnitzki, participants at the 5th European Conference 
on Corporate R&D and Innovation (CONCORDi, October 2015) in Seville (in particular Bronwyn H. Hall, 
Ruslan Lukach, and Jürgen Janger), and participants of the PhD Workshop organized by the University of Turin 
and Collegio Carlo Alberto (December 2014) for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to 
Tom Swerts, the head of general credit management at a large Belgian bank for an interview on the relevance of 
R&D subsidy grants and loan applications. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Well-performing capital markets are essential to drive a region’s economic growth through 
facilitating investments in research and development (R&D) and innovation (see e.g., Levine, 
1997; de la Fuente and Marin, 1996; Levine, 2005). Frictions in financial markets may 
hamper such investments, leading to slower technological progress (Aghion et al., 2005; 
Brown et al., 2009). The most prominent friction is the occurrence of information 
asymmetries between the investing firm and external financiers regarding the quality, i.e., the 
expected returns of an R&D project (see Hall and Lerner, 2010, for a survey). External 
financiers may therefore be reluctant to finance R&D projects, especially of firms that have 
little reputation, low collateral value, and a high overall risk of bankruptcy. Indeed, financing 
constraints have been shown to be most binding for small and young firms (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Müller and Zimmerman, 2009; Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott, 2011a) or firms pursuing radical innovation strategies (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 
2011b).  
Compared to other external financiers such as banks, venture capitalists are typically better 
able to overcome asymmetric information problems by specializing in certain sectors, 
carefully screening and monitoring the investment, and by offering expertise to the firm 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Hall and Hofer, 1993; Shepherd et al., 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 
2001; Baum and Silverman, 2004). However, venture capital is usually not the most common 
form of financing innovative projects, particularly in Europe (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Hall 
and Lerner, 2010). First, venture capital tends to target start-ups in a selected, but limited 
number of sectors. Moreover, it entails equity-type investments and most often the 
involvement of the venture capitalist in business activities, which not all owners appreciate. In 
fact, in continental European countries the financial market is generally ‘bank-based’ rather 
than ‘market-oriented’ (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Vermoesen et al., 2013), which 
stresses the role of banks in financing innovation activities and the challenge firms face to 
overcome information asymmetries. In addition, a recent literature review of Kerr and Nanda 
(2014) highlights that also in the US, bank loans are a relevant source of financing innovation. 
One way of directly addressing market failures which lead to financing constraints for 
innovation are public subsidy programs that provide R&D grants (see e.g., Klette et al., 2000). 
The impact of such grants on firms’ innovation investments has been subject to a large stream 
of studies concerned with whether or not such programs trigger additional investments or 
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simply crowd out privately financed investments. These studies generally find that recipient 
firms invest higher amounts in R&D compared to non-recipients even when the selection into 
these support programs is accounted for (see e.g., Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006; Aerts and 
Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014).  
The mechanisms through which such additional investments become feasible, however, have 
received much less attention. Takalo and Tanayama (2010) argue that, in principle, R&D 
subsidies can reduce a firm’s financing constraints in two ways. First, the subsidy lowers the 
need for external funding, thus reducing the overall cost of financing R&D. Second, the 
receipt of an R&D subsidy can provide an “informative signal to the market-based financiers” 
(Takalo and Tanayama, 2010, p. 18). Participation in government-sponsored support 
programs can thus signal qualitative information to investors, hereby reducing their screening 
costs related to evaluating the firm or project (Narayanan et al., 2000). By providing a quality 
certification, subsidies may not only help firms investing in R&D by providing money 
directly, i.e. a ‘resource effect’, but subsidies may also facilitate access to external financing 
(Feldman and Kelley, 2006; Kleer, 2010). This mechanism may work for both institutional 
investors and banks. Lerner (1999), for example, shows that high-tech firms that received a 
government grant as part of the US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program are 
better able to attract external financing from venture capitalists. He suggests that this is 
because the subsidy can certify the otherwise hard-to-observe quality of the awardees to 
investors. In the context of bank financing, Meuleman and De Maeseneire (2012) find that 
SMEs that received an R&D subsidy are more likely to attract long-term debt financing. 
Recently, scholars therefore pointed to the importance of ‘selective’ support schemes as 
opposed to ‘automatic’ schemes like tax credits (e.g., Colombo et al., 2011; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2012).  
The challenge related to the identification of the effects of public R&D grants on access to 
financing is the distinction between the different channels through which the subsidy may 
work, i.e., a direct ‘resource effect’ which improves the liquidity situation of the firm and a 
‘certification effect’. Moreover, alongside the ‘resource effect’ and ‘certification effect’ there 
is another possible channel, which has so far not been addressed, through which participation 
in subsidy programs may affect the lending situation of firms. An exploratory interview with 
the head of general credit management at a large Belgian bank pointed to this third 
mechanism that may be labeled as ‘formation effect’: “Firms that have gone through the 
subsidy application process did their homework and are better prepared to respond to the 
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critical questions posed by the bank when applying for a loan.” Such a ‘formation effect’ may 
become possible if the screening process conducted by the government agency resembles the 
evaluation procedure of a bank. By going through the grant application process, particularly 
inexperienced firms improve their R&D project plan and gain experience in defending the 
commercialization potential of their project. In line with this view, a recent study by Grilli and 
Murtinu (2015) shows that the receipt of a ‘selective’ government subsidy increases an 
NTBF’s access to R&D alliances and that the capability to ‘exploit’ this signal is reinforced 
through the founder’s industry-specific work experience.  
This paper aims to contribute to previous work in at least two major ways. First, the impact of 
the subsidy on external financing might not only be access to loans, but it may also affect the 
cost of debt. Although previous studies investigated whether obtaining government support 
for R&D increases the firm’s access to external sources of financing (Lerner, 1999, Feldman 
and Kelley, 2006; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012), evidence of the impact on external 
capital cost is missing. So far, we can only derive expectations from the accounting literature 
which suggests that – in general – disclosure can lower the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; 
Francis et al., 2005). One novelty of this study is therefore to investigate how the receipt of an 
R&D grant affects a firm’s cost of debt. Second, next to the separation from ‘certification’ 
and ‘resource effects’, this study tests explicitly for a ‘formation effect’, that is, whether 
application experience independent of grant success plays a role in the cost of debt. The 
analysis is based on a unique, comprehensive dataset of Belgian subsidized and non-
subsidized firms (including rejected applicants) at different stages of maturity and active in a 
variety of sectors.  
For different panel model specifications, we find evidence of the existence of a certification 
effect, which is associated with a lower average cost of debt while we can rule out the 
dominance of a resource effect. Differentiating between young and established firms shows 
that young firms mainly benefit from grants for basic research projects, which is the type of 
activity that typically suffers more from financing constraints compared to product or process 
development projects (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). In addition, young firms appear to benefit from 
a ‘formation effect’ in which having applied for a subsidy has a beneficial impact on the cost 
of debt irrespective of the granting decision. This result points to the existence of learning 
effects through the subsidy application process, i.e., a “preparation premium” that is of 
greatest value for young, inexperienced firms. The results are robust to different model 
specifications and to accounting for the endogeneity of the subsidy receipt. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the relevant previous research on 
which we base our research questions. Section 3 presents the data and methodology for the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  
2. Direct and Indirect Effects from an R&D Grant Receipt 
Governments typically address potential underinvestment in innovation by setting up public 
support programs such as R&D subsidy schemes. Such programs, especially selective ones, 
i.e., grant application-based and targeted schemes, have been shown to trigger additional 
investments in the recipient firms, at least on average (see e.g., David et al., 2000). Not 
surprisingly, R&D subsidies are one of the largest and fastest-growing forms of industrial aid 
in developed countries (Nevo, 1998; Pretschker, 1998). R&D grants usually work as co-
funding schemes in which the funding agency takes over part of the proposed project cost. 
The share in total project costs covered by the agency is referred to as the subsidy rate 
(Hottenrott et al., 2014; Takalo et al., 2013a; Takalo et al., 2013b). Such schemes are usually 
designed so as to increase private investments by compensating the investing firm for the 
social returns to the investment. Previous research of such direct effects, however, also 
suggests that firms not only seem to match the grant with their required share but also seem to 
invest more in R&D outside the scope of the grant (Clausen, 2009; Hottenrott et al., 2014).  
In principle, such additional investments may become feasible through several mechanisms. 
First, previous research has shown that the more internal resources the firm has at its disposal, 
the lower the likelihood of suffering from financial constraints (Himmelberg and Petersen, 
1994; Savignac, 2008; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012). As grants constitute a liquidity shock, 
these additional resources may reduce a firm’s default risk, making lenders more willing to 
provide a loan. At the same time, grants lower the required amount of internal and external 
financing the firm needs to develop itself. R&D subsidies can therefore stimulate private 
R&D investment by enabling firms to finance a smaller part of their projects with debt capital 
(Czarnitzki, 2006). As firms receiving an R&D grant need to raise less money externally, the 
subsidy affects the capital cost by lowering the need for external financing because the cost of 
debt typically declines with a decreasing total level of debt (see e.g., Pittman and Fortin, 
2004). Smaller requested loans may further have a higher granting probability and may come 
at lower interest rates. These mechanisms can be summarized as ‘resource effects’.  Following 
the approach of Lerner (1999), Meuleman and De Maeseneire (2012) control for what they 
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call the ‘buffering effect’ and show that this effect only matters for short-term debt, but that 
for long-term debt a ‘certification effect’ is prevalent.  
Indeed, previous research has pointed to the existence of a ‘certification effect’ of public 
subsidies (e.g., Lerner, 1999; Feldman and Kelley, 2006; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 
2012). Similar to other signaling devices, an R&D grant receipt may provide an observable 
signal that serves to alleviate information problems, similar to a job market signal as first 
discussed by Spence (1973). More specifically, managers of firms investing in R&D may 
reduce information asymmetries between them and the bank by revealing qualitative 
information about their R&D projects through mentioning the grant receipt (Narayanan et al., 
2000). For such certification to work, the signaling device must be difficult or costly to obtain 
and must be easily observed and verified by outsiders (Spence, 1973), as it is in the case for 
patents (see e.g., Long, 2002; Hottenrott et al. 2015a). Likewise, selective
1
 R&D subsidies 
from a reputable government agency meet the conditions for an effective signal. Lerner 
(1999), for instance, finds that high-tech firms that are awarded a grant stemming from the 
SBIR program are better able to attract venture capital funds as the awards can ‘certify’ the 
firms to private financiers and in this way lower information asymmetries. Feldman and 
Kelley (2006) illustrate that participants of the US Advanced Technology Program attract 
more financing from all other external funding sources compared to non-subsidized firms. 
They argue this is because a government R&D subsidy assigns a ‘halo effect’ to the 
recipients, which raises financing opportunities from other fund providers. In line with this 
finding, Meuleman and De Maeseneire (2012) show that firms that received an R&D subsidy 
within the SME-scheme from the Ministry of Technology in the Belgian region of Flanders 
increased their long-term debt financing following the subsidy award pointing to a 
certification effect that facilitated these additional long-term loans.  
Third, in addition to the certification effect and the resource effect, there may be another 
possible mechanism related to the subsidy application process, which mainly applies to young 
or less experienced firms. For more established as well as for young firms, bank loans play a 
major role in bank-based capital markets such as in Western Europe (Achleitner et al. 2011). 
Robb and Robinson (2014) show that US startups also rely to a large extent on debt financing. 
Being prepared when seeking funding from external financiers, especially when these are not 
                                                          
1
 See Colombo et al. (2011) for a definition of a ‘selective subsidy’: “A selective scheme provides financial 
support to selected applicants. Applicants compete for receiving a subsidy and their projects are judged by 
committees formed by experts.” 
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specialized in the business area of the applicant firm, is therefore essential (see e.g., Cardon et 
al., 2009; Pollack et al., 2012). The main way in which this preparation is usually fulfilled is 
by developing a business plan that helps to convince investors and thus to increase the firm’s 
access to external financing. As noted by Zimmerer and Scarborough (2008; p. 123): “A 
business plan is a planning tool for transforming an idea into reality. … Its primary goals are 
to guide entrepreneurs as they launch and operate their businesses and to help them acquire 
the necessary financing to launch”. Potential lenders such as banks typically emphasize the 
financial part of such a business plan when deciding on the provision of funds (Mason and 
Stark, 2004; Zimmerer and Scarborough, 2008). Chen et al. (2009) argue that the 
‘preparedness’ of the entrepreneur when presenting a business plan is salient in influencing 
the venture capitalists’ decision for providing financing. Moreover, Rasmussen et al. (2011) 
suggest that the ability to identify an opportunity and translate it into a clear and feasible 
“business concept” is pivotal for university spin-offs to raise their reliability and ability to 
gain access to key resources such as financing. 
Selective subsidy programs in which the assignment of the grants is based on a screening 
process involving expert reviews and interviews might simulate this project plan preparation. 
The screening of the subsidy applications often involves a review process of an R&D project 
plan, containing information on the financial and market prospects of the R&D project. One 
example is the evaluation process of the agency for Innovation by Science and Technology 
(IWT) in Flanders (see e.g., Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013).
2
 Applying for a subsidy, 
irrespective of whether or not the subsidy is granted, might therefore assist firms in improving 
their R&D project plans and preparing themselves for applying for debt. In the accounting 
literature, it has also been shown that information quality affects a firm’s “real decisions”, 
which subsequently influence the cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007). Better preparation and 
enhanced R&D project outlines alleviate asymmetric information between the lender and 
borrower, allowing them to persuade the external investor and possibly reduce the external 
capital cost. As the learning potential and the asymmetric information are typically higher for 
young firms, this type of indirect mechanism, i.e. a ‘formation effect’ of R&D subsidy 
schemes may matter more for less experienced firms compared to more established ones.  
  
                                                          
2
 The next section discusses in more depth the screening procedure applied by this government agency. 
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3. Data and Method 
3.1 Data 
We combine four data sources into a unique database in order to investigate the indirect 
effects of R&D grants on firms’ cost of debt. First, detailed information on all R&D subsidy 
applications, including granted as well as rejected proposals, is provided by IWT’s (the 
Flemish agency for Innovation by Science and Technology) ICAROS database. IWT is the 
main institute for offering financial support for R&D and innovation in Flanders. Firms that 
apply for an R&D subsidy at IWT have to go through a peer review process before a granting 
decision is made. Each applicant (or consortium) is required to submit a detailed description 
of the R&D project, a plan explaining how it will account for the risks, and carefully describe 
expectations such as the commercialization potential of the project, the financial feasibility, 
and the potential benefits for the region. An expert panel, consisting of internal and external 
referees, executes the evaluation of the project proposal, paying particular attention to the 
economic valorization potential of the project. The original funding data covers the period 
1992 to 2011 and includes virtually all applications that were submitted during that period. 
Next to the applicant information, the subsidy amount, the total projects costs and, hence, the 
subsidy rate, the funding data contain information on the starting and end date, i.e., the 
duration of the project and the specific scheme under which the project was submitted. Firms 
can apply for different schemes within the R&D program that distinguish (basic) research 
projects from experimental product or process development, as well as mixed projects that 
involve both research and development.   
Table 1 displays an overview of the granted and rejected R&D subsidy applications in 
Flanders in the period 1999–2011. The total number of R&D grants throughout the period 
under study amounts to 4,766. About one quarter of all subsidy applications was rejected 
during the 13 years considered, resulting in an overall grant rate of 75.4%. The number of 
granted R&D subsidies and also the number of denied applications peaked in the post-
financial crisis years 2009 and 2010. Of the firms that applied for a subsidy, the average 
application count amounts to 1.3 in a certain year. The total count of research grants (1,832; 
38.4%) is similar to the total count of development grants (1,841; 38.6%), whereas the total 
mixed R&D subsidy count is lower (1,093; 22.9%). The different schemes differ in their 
subsidy rate. Due to the potentially higher social returns and spillover effects, basic research 
projects tend to be co-funded by the agency with a larger share (56.0% on average), while 
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development projects have an average subsidy rate of 37.6%. Subsidy rates for mixed projects 
are usually in-between the two (with a mean of 46.0%). The overall subsidy rate is 46.4%. 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
We obtain information on the firms’ overall R&D and innovation activities from the Flemish 
part of the OECD R&D surveys.
3
 We match firms from the ICAROS subsidy database with 
the R&D surveys based on the firms’ unique tax numbers. In addition, the R&D surveys cover 
the vast majority of potentially R&D-active firms in Flanders, which provides us with a large 
‘control group’ of firms that did not apply for R&D subsidies.   
In addition, the BELFIRST database assembled by Bureau van Dijk provides financial and 
accounting information of all firms in our sample, which we can also merge using tax 
numbers. Based on firms’ names and addresses, we further collect firms’ patent applications 
(and granted patents) from the PATSTAT database provided by the European Patent Office.   
Due to the entry and exit of firms and the non-compulsory nature of the R&D surveys, the 
resulting panel structure is unbalanced. Therefore, we require that each firm is observed at 
least twice in the dataset in order to estimate meaningful panel data models. After the 
elimination of incomplete records and outliers, the final dataset comprises 5,796 observations 
from 1,689 different firms, covering the period 2000–2012.4 The final sample employed in 
this study consists of firms at different stages of maturity and active in different sectors. Table 
2 shows the industry structure of the firms in the sample. 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
3.2 Variables 
Debt financing  
The main dependent variable is the firm’s average cost of debt. We compute this indicator by 
dividing interest paid
5
 in year t by the amount of total assets in year t (cost of debtt). 
Normalizing interest paid by means of total assets allows accounting for differences in firm 
size and hence potential gross financing needs. Moreover, this results in a comparable 
measure of debt charges across firms, irrespective of their debt levels, and indicates how 
                                                          
3
 The Flemish R&D survey is conducted every two years according to the Frascati-Manual (OECD [2002], 
‘Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development: Frascati Manual: The 
Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Series’, Paris). 
4
 This time period starts 1 year after the aforementioned time period of 1999–2011 covering the subsidy 
information as a 1-year lag of the subsidy variables is used in the analyses. 
5
 Account number 650 of the annual account format that has to be filed with the National Bank of Belgium. 
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much interest the firm pays per asset employed. Further, scaling interest paid by debt levels 
would be rather inappropriate because the relative amounts of short-term and long-term debt 
are added to the model as explanatory variables due to their impact on interest paid. In 
addition, to measure access to debt financing we derive a variable indicating whether the firm 
increased its debt in year t compared to the previous year (change in debtt).  
R&D Subsidies  
From the detailed subsidy information, we can derive a variety of subsidy indicators. We 
employ a multitude of different indicators in the analysis to avoid the possibility that effects 
are due to a specific measurement of the subsidy receipt. The first variable is the R&D 
subsidy rate, i.e., the share in the total R&D project borne by the funding agency (subsidy 
ratet-1). We can split the subsidy rate variable into the three types of subsidies: basic research 
subsidies (basic subsidy ratet-1), mixed subsidies (mixed subsidy ratet-1), and development 
subsidies (development subsidy ratet-1). We employ a one-year lag to prevent direct 
simultaneity between dependent and independent variables. In addition, we construct a simple 
binary variable indicating whether the firm received at least one R&D subsidy (subsidy 
dummyt-1) and a count of the number of granted subsidies (subsidy countt-1). A further main 
independent variable indicates whether the firm submitted at least one subsidy application that 
was rejected (rejected dummyt-1).  
In a set of additional tests, we employ different versions of these variables in the model. 
These measures include the total amount of received subsidies scaled by total assets ([subsidy 
amount/total assets]t-1), the count of subsidy applications including rejected ones (application 
countt-1), and the share of granted subsidies over the total number of applications (grant ratet-
1). The regressions also include a set of past subsidy indicators relating to the years t-2 and t-3 
which allow us to test for the persistency of the subsidy effect over time. 
Control Variables 
The amount of R&D investments gives an indication of the overall funding requirements for 
R&D in year t. In addition, this variable controls for the firms’ risky, longer-term investments 
that typically face a higher capital cost compared to other types of investment. As the 
distribution of R&D expenditures across firms is highly skewed, we scale it by the number of 
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employees (R&D expenditures per emplt). The firm’s patent stock
6
 serves as a proxy for past 
R&D success (ln[patent stock]t-1) and it controls for other signaling mechanisms that have 
been shown to matter in the context of R&D financing (see e.g., Hottenrott et al., 2015a). The 
ratio of cash flow over total assets in year t-1 allows us to account for past firm performance, 
as well as for the presence of internal funds ([cashflow/total assets]t-1). In addition, the extent 
to which current assets cover current liabilities is an indicator of the current operating 
liquidity or solvency (liquidityt). We also account for the firm’s leverage by including the 
level of short-term debt and the level of long-term debt, both scaled by total assets ([short-
term debt/total assets]t and [long-term debt/total assets]t). Other firm-level control variables 
capture firm size effects (ln[empl]t), non-linearities (ln[empl
2
]t) in these effects, and firm age 
(aget). Year dummies are included to capture business cycle effects that may affect both the 
access to debt as well as the cost of debt. Industry dummies based on the firms’ main activity 
according to the NACE (rev. 2) capture sector-specific differences in models that do not 
contain firm fixed effects.
7
  
 
3.3 Sample Characteristics 
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the relevant variables for the applicants and the 
subsidized firms respectively. The final sample contains 461 applicant-year observations, 
which account for 780 applications during the period of analysis. Of the firms that filed at 
least one application in a certain year, 29.1% were granted at least one basic research subsidy, 
35.1% a mixed subsidy, and 41.2% a subsidy for development projects. The total number of 
granted subsidies equals 668 and the number of rejected applications amounts to 112. In the 
final sample, 405 firm-year observations received at least one subsidy, of which at least 134 
were ‘basic’, 162 were ‘mixed’, and 190 were ‘development grants’. Of the subsidized firms, 
the mean subsidy rate equals 41.7%.  
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
Table 4 shows the distribution of first-time applications across years in our final sample. Of 
the total number of subsidy applications (780), about 14.7% are first-time subsidy 
applications. 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
                                                          
6
 A depreciation rate of 15% is assumed (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1984).  
7
 Random effects probit regression and matching analysis. See section 4.4 for details.  
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Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the full sample (both subsidized and non-subsidized 
firms). The mean debt charges are approximately 1.2% of total assets and about 38% of the 
firms increased their debt level compared to the previous year. Firms in the sample spend, on 
average, €5,163 per employee on R&D per year. The mean patent stock of all firms in the 
sample equals 1.17 and about 363 (i.e., 21.5% of all) firms have an average patent stock that 
is larger than zero in the period under study. Regarding the financial indicators, the firm’s 
average cash flow amounts to 9.4% of its total assets, current assets are typically 77.7% larger 
than current liabilities, and the ratios of short-term debt over total assets and long-term debt 
over total assets are equal to 10.6% and 14.2% respectively. The average age of the firms in 
the sample is 29 years (the median equals 24), while the mean size amounts to 235 employees 
(the median is about 81). 
--- Insert Table 5 here --- 
3.4 Identification Strategy 
3.4.1 Base Model 
The panel structure of our data allows the implementation of fixed effects regression models. 
The advantage of this method is that it accounts for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity 
through firm-specific effects. Cost of debt in firm 𝑖 is estimated as a function of subsidy 
application indicators, innovation-related measures, financial indicators, age and size controls, 
and business cycle effects. The general model can be written as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖  =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑖𝛾 +  𝐼𝑖𝜆 +  𝐹𝑖𝜇 +  𝐴𝐸𝑖𝛿 +  𝑇𝑖𝜋 +  𝑢𝑖  +  𝑐𝑖 (1) 
The vector 𝑆 consists of the subsidy application indicators: a variable referring to the subsidy 
receipt (either [subsidy rate]t-1, [subsidy dummy]t-1 or [subsidy count]t-1) and a variable 
indicating whether firm 𝑖 has at least one rejected subsidy application (rejected dummyt-1): 
𝑆𝑖 =  𝜃1(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡)𝑖 +  𝛽(𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖    (2) 
The vector 𝐼 in equation (1) comprises innovation-related measures such as the relative 
amount of R&D expenditures (R&D expenditures per emplt) and the patent stock (ln[patent 
stock]t-1). 𝐹 consists of financial indicators such as past performance ([cashflow/total assets]t-
1), liquidity (liquidityt) and debt leverage ([short-term debt/total assets]t and [short-term 
debt/total assets]t). 𝐴𝐸 contains age (aget) and size controls (ln[empl]t and ln[empl
2
]t). 𝑇 
comprises the set of year dummies. Further, 𝛾, 𝜆, 𝜇, 𝛿 and 𝜋 represent vectors of parameters 
to be estimated. Finally, parameter 𝑢 is the error term, and 𝑐 captures the time-constant firm-
specific effect. The parameter 𝛼 is the constant. 
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A priori, one would expect 𝜃1 (in equation 2) to be negative in the presence of resource and/or 
certification effects. The next subsection clarifies the identification of the different 
mechanisms in more detail. Parameter 𝛽 is not expected to indicate a significant impact on 
cost of debt as a negative signal following from a rejected application is typically not 
observed (see e.g., Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). The inclusion of the rejected 
application variable also captures a firm’s efforts to get a grant even if the application was not 
successful.  
3.4.2 Identification of a Resource Effect 
To identify the potential resource effects of an R&D grant receipt on the cost of debt, the 
vector 𝑆𝑖 of equation (1) is extended to the following expression: 
𝑆𝑖 =  𝜃1(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡)𝑖 + 𝜃2 (
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)
𝑖
+  𝛽(𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 (3) 
In particular, we add the subsidy amount scaled by total assets ([subsidy amount/total assets]t-
1) on top of the subsidy receipt variable (either [subsidy rate]t-1, or [subsidy dummy]t-1). The 
parameters to be estimated are 𝜃1, 𝜃2.and 𝛽. To identify the resource effects in addition to the 
main effect of the subsidy receipt (𝜃1), coefficient 𝜃2 denotes the sign and magnitude of the 
liquidity impact of R&D subsidies on the cost of debt. The larger the subsidy amount relative 
to the firm’s asset base, the more relevant it should be for a bank’s lending decision. The 
potential influence of a resource effect should therefore be reflected in a significant and 
negative impact of the relative subsidy amount (𝜃2), next to the possible negative impact of 
the subsidy receipt as such (𝜃1). 
3.4.3 Identification of a Certification Effect 
The prominence of the certification effect can be identified by means of the subsidy receipt 
indicator as outlined in equation (3). In particular, coefficient 𝜃1 indicates the strength of this 
effect. If 𝜃1 points to a negative and significant impact of the subsidy receipt while the 
relative subsidy amount does not significantly affect cost of debt, the existence of a 
certification effect that lowers asymmetric information problems between the lender and 
investor will be confirmed.  
Moreover, as the certification effect is expected to be stronger for more information-opaque 
activities (see e.g., Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012; Hottenrott et al. 2015b), an 
additional test for the identification of the certification effect is to divide the subsidy receipt 
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variable based on the three different schemes. Thus, the subsidy receipt indicator of the base 
model is adapted to the following expression: 
𝑆𝑖 =  ∑ 𝜃𝑘
5
𝑘=3
(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒)𝑖  +  𝛽(𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 (4) 
The coefficients 𝜃3, 𝜃4 and 𝜃5 are the parameters to be estimated for the basic subsidy, the 
mixed subsidy, and the development subsidy receipt respectively. Previous research has 
shown that financing constraints are particularly binding for investments in research projects 
compared to development, because information asymmetries are typically stronger for more 
basic research projects that are further away from commercialization and hence more 
uncertain in terms of their expected returns (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Therefore, one would 
expect that the negative impact of the R&D subsidy receipt on a firm’s cost of debt is stronger 
for ‘basic subsidies’ (𝜃3) compared to ‘mixed’ (𝜃4) or ‘development’ subsidies (𝜃5). 
3.4.4 Identification of a Formation Effect  
For the identification of a formation effect, vector 𝑆𝑖 of the base model [equation (1)] is 
adapted to the following specification: 
𝑆𝑖 =  𝜃6(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖 +  𝜃7(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖 (5) 
Parameter 𝜃6 estimates the effect of the firm’s success rate in the application process. 
Coefficient 𝜃7 captures the intensity to which a firm aimed at attracting R&D grants. This is 
an important control variable given that the grant rate may by definition decrease if the 
number of trials increases or – the other way around – firms may apply more frequently if not 
all applications had been successful.   
If 𝜃6 shows a negative sign, that is, a lower cost of debt is observed for higher grant rates, 
evidence will point in the direction of either the resource effect or the certification effect, 
depending on the outcome of the resource effect test [see equation (3)]. If 𝜃7 adversely 
influenced a firm’s debt charges, keeping the grant rate constant, the result would favor the 
existence of a formation effect. In particular, this would mean that applying for an R&D grant 
is beneficial in terms of having a lower cost of debt irrespective of the grant success. This 
would suggest that the application process provides learning potential per se, for instance, 
through inducing firms to prepare and revise their R&D project plans. Note that an additional 
way to test for the formation effect is to consider coefficient 𝛽 of the rejected application 
dummy variable [see equation (2)]. In particular, a negative and significant β in equation (1) 
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would allude to the preparation benefit of the subsidy application process in which the 
rejected grants also have an effect on interest rates.  
3.4.5 Firm heterogeneity 
If there are indeed indirect effects of R&D subsidies on firms’ cost of debt, we would expect 
them to be stronger for young, inexperienced, and less-established firms that do not yet have a 
sound reputation or strong relationships with their bank. To test for such differences, we 
perform the tests outlined in equations (4) and (5) for young and established firms separately.  
4. Results 
4.1 Basic Model 
Table 6 displays the results of the base model for three different versions of the R&D subsidy 
receipt variable: the subsidy rate, the subsidy dummy, and the subsidy count. As can be 
observed, the receipt of an R&D grant in year t-1 has a negative and significant impact on a 
firm’s average interest rate in year t, all else constant. As an illustration, a 100% increase of 
the past subsidy rate reduces the cost of debt by 0.202%, which is 14.4% of the average cost 
of debt (1.4%) of those firms with an initial positive cost of debt. Likewise, the coefficient of 
the subsidy dummy variable amounts to -0.077, meaning that the receipt of an R&D grant in 
year t-1 lowers the share of debt charges over total assets in year t by 5.5% of the mean cost 
of debt of all firms in the sample.
8
 The variable indicating the number of denied R&D grant 
requests does not significantly affect the cost of debt capital. This is in line with previous 
evidence suggesting that external parties do not observe the negative signal of a rejected 
subsidy application (Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). Although the signs of the past 
subsidy indicators relating to the years t-2 and t-3 are negative, they are not statistically 
significant.
9
 
The signs of the coefficients of most control variables are as expected. R&D spending has a 
positive impact on a firm’s external capital cost. This is consistent with existing research that 
has shown that financing R&D investment externally is more expensive compared to capital 
investment (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011a). The patent stock is not statistically significant. 
The cash flow measure highlights that past firm performance, marking the presence of 
internal funds, has a strong and negative impact on cost of debt. Further, firms that have a 
                                                          
8
 -0.077/0.014 = -5.5 
9
 Using different lag structures of the subsidy variables lead to the same results. 
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higher operating liquidity ratio pay, on average, less debt charges. As expected, the amount of 
debt charges positively correlates with the firm’s level of debt. Likely because of long-term 
relationship lending and reputation building, older firms face, on average, a lower capital cost. 
Firm size, measured by the number of employees, has an inverse U-shaped effect.
10
  
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
4.2 Resource or Certification Effect? 
To test for the existence of the resource effect, the relative subsidy amount is added to the 
base model. Table 7 shows the results. The subsidy rate and the binary subsidy variable 
remain significant. Receiving a larger total amount of subsidies, relative to total assets, does 
not significantly strengthen the negative influence on the cost of debt capital. This result 
suggests that the negative impact of a subsidy receipt on the cost of debt stems mainly from a 
certification effect and not only from a resource effect,
11
 supporting the view that the 
signaling value of receiving public support can significantly affect the cost of debt. The 
impact of the other control variables is very similar to the base model. 
--- Insert Table 7 here --- 
4.3 Formation Effect: Young versus Established Firms 
As young firms in particular may benefit from acquiring experience in preparing their R&D 
project plans when applying for loans, we divide the sample into young and established firms 
to check for differences between the two groups. In a baseline version of the models, a firm is 
classified as being young when it belongs to the 50% youngest firms in the sample (i.e., their 
age is 23 years or younger). The regression results are displayed in Table 8. Model (1) and 
Model (3) contain the tests for a formation effect. For young firms (Model 1), the number of 
subsidy applications negatively influences their cost of debt, irrespective of whether or not the 
subsidy was granted. For more established firms, the share of granted subsidy applications 
matters, pointing only to the certification effect (Model 3). This result suggests the existence 
of a “preparation premium” for younger firms through applying for a subsidy. The financial 
part, in particular the commercialization potential of the R&D project, is especially important 
for the funding agency IWT. Hence, having gone through the grant application process of the 
                                                          
10
 The maximum level of (debt charges/total assets) is at a firm size of 556 employees. 
11
 The VIF (variance inflation factor) test indicates that the inclusion of the subsidy amount in addition to the 
other subsidy indicators does not cause multicollinearity. 
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government agency may predominantly help inexperienced firms to strengthen their project 
outline, which also prepares them for a loan application process at a financial institution.  
Models (2) and (4) show that the subsidy rate is significant only for young firms. This is 
consistent with earlier studies pointing out that certification matters more where the degree of 
asymmetric information is high, which is typically the case for research projects for which the 
subsidy rate is higher, and for smaller and younger firms more generally (see e.g., Lerner, 
1999; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). It is, however, remarkable that for young firms, 
having a rejected subsidy application is also negatively associated with its average interest 
rate (Model 2). This again points to the existence of a formation effect, i.e. a beneficial effect 
of the subsidy application irrespective of the grant decision. For established firms, the rejected 
variable is not significant (Model 4).  
--- Insert Table 8 here --- 
Table 9 shows the results of the regressions that make a distinction between the three different 
subsidy schemes. For young firms, the negative impact on cost of debt is driven significantly 
by grants for basic research projects. As information asymmetries between the firm and the 
external financier are typically larger for research projects compared to development, the 
signal from research grants, but also the “preparation premium”, can be higher. Hence, the 
cost of debt can be reduced by providing information on the quality of the young firm’s 
research to an external investor. For older firms, all three subsidy types have a negative 
impact on cost of debt, but the coefficient is only significant for mixed grants. This suggest 
that older firms not only seem to benefit less from the grant preparation process, but also that 
the certification effect is potentially weaker and the significant main effects (Tables 6 and 7) 
were driven by the younger firms in the sample.  
--- Insert Table 9 here --- 
4.4 Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Substitution Effect 
An alternative interpretation of the possible impact of R&D subsidies on cost of debt could be 
that subsidies are a substitute for debt, in that way lowering debt charges. To this end, we 
examine the impact of the subsidy rate (subsidy ratet-1) on the propensity to raise debt (change 
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in debtt)
12
 by estimating a random effects probit regression. Table 10 shows the impact of the 
subsidy rate on the propensity to raise debt. Consistent with previous studies, the results show 
that firms with a higher subsidy rate are more likely to increase their debt, ruling out the 
dominance of a substitution effect. The result also supports our finding that the resource effect 
of public R&D subsidies plays a minor role as regards access to loans and cost of debt. In 
particular, receiving an R&D subsidy does not necessarily lead to lower debt levels and 
consequently lower debt charges. 
--- Insert Table 10 here --- 
4.4.2 Time period-specific events 
The time span of our panel covers the years before, during, and after the global financial crisis 
that started in 2008. The financial crisis had a considerable impact on R&D and innovation in 
many countries (OECD, 2012). In periods of high demand uncertainty and constrained 
budgets, it becomes more important to selectively allocate available resources to investment 
options. To examine whether the financial crisis drives or intensifies the effects, we add 
interaction terms of the years 2008–2010 with the subsidy rate to equation (1). Table 11 
displays the results. Adding these interaction terms does not affect the previous results and the 
interaction terms are insignificant. This indicates that the certification effect was not 
significantly stronger in any of these years which is consistent with the observation that in 
Belgium the business enterprise expenditure on R&D remained more or less stable (and even 
slightly increased) during the crisis years (OECD, 2012).  
--- Insert Table 11 here --- 
4.4.3 Endogeneity of the subsidy receipt and selection issues 
As a final robustness test, we use a non-parametric nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching (NNPM) to check whether the fixed effects regression results hold when accounting 
for possible self-selection or agency-based selection of firms into the subsidy program that 
could bias the presented estimation results. In other words, we estimate the difference 
between the cost of debt of R&D subsidy recipients and the counterfactual situation where 
these firms would not have received a subsidy.
13
 The advantage of this method is that it does 
                                                          
12
 In the model on change in debt, the number of observations decreases, as missing values and outliers of the 
lagged debt values have to be removed (contemporaneous debt levels are used in the other regressions). 
13
 We follow the matching protocol of Gerfin and Lechner (2002). See Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) for a 
detailed description of an application of the method. 
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not require assumptions about the error term or functional form. Another way to address 
selection issues is to implement an instrumental variables estimation. The downside of this 
method, however, is that one needs valid instruments, a requirement that is challenging and 
the bias in the case of weak instruments can be severe. 
In the selection stage of the matching procedure, we account for factors that likely explain the 
grant decision of the agency. Thus, in order to obtain the propensity score, we estimate a 
cross-sectional probit model with clustered standard errors on the likelihood of receiving an 
R&D subsidy (see Table 12a). To appropriately account for the selection into the subsidy 
program, we chose those control variables that have been shown to be important in the R&D 
subsidy application procedure in previous studies using data from the same funding agency 
(see e.g., Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013; Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento, 2014). Specifically, we add a past application dummy indicating whether the 
firm applied for a subsidy in the two years before t-1 to control for application experience. 
Further, we control for whether the firm was active in an R&D cooperation in year t-1 as this 
is highly encouraged by the government agency that grants the R&D subsidies and thus may 
drive the selection. Finally, firm-level control variables such as R&D expenditures, age, size, 
debt leverage, and other financial indicators, are supposed to capture important factors that 
may drive both the firms’ decision to apply for a subsidy and the grant decision of the agency.  
--- Insert Table 12a here --- 
After estimating the propensity score, we restrict the sample to common support. In other 
words, we delete all observations on treated firms for which the probabilities are smaller than 
the minimum or larger than the maximum in the control group. Moreover, we impose the 
restriction that matched pairs have to be overserved in the same year given the likely 
fluctuations of interest rates over the years. After implementing the matching procedure, we 
compare the treated group to the selected control group and find that only the outcome 
variable is significantly different between both groups. This indicates that for every 
subsidized firm a good match had been found in the group of non-subsidized firms. The 
results in Table 12b show that even when accounting for possible self- and agency selection 
into the subsidy program, the R&D subsidy recipients have a lower cost of debt compared to 
the non-recipients, providing additional support for the existence of the certification effect.  
--- Insert Table 12b here --- 
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The same matching analysis is executed to test the robustness of the result that subsidized 
versus non-subsidized firms differ in their access to debt. Here, we impose the restriction that 
matched pairs are required to operate in the same industry given the fact that banks usually 
adjust their loan-granting process for each industry. The results are displayed in Table 12c and 
indicate that subsidized firms are more likely to increase their debt levels compared to non-
subsidized firms. In other words, a substitution effect in which subsidies replace debt does not 
drive the result that subsidized firms face lower cost of debt. 
--- Insert Table 12c here --- 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Firms’ ability to finance R&D activities is crucial for the innovation potential of these firms 
and hence for their competitiveness. Previous research stressed the role of R&D subsidies as a 
major policy tool for supporting R&D activities in the private sector (see e.g., Klette et al., 
2000). Recently, studies have pointed to secondary effects of such subsidy schemes. In 
particular, selective R&D grants may serve as certification devices to firms, improving their 
access to financing (Lerner, 1999; Feldman and Kelley, 2006; Colombo et al. 2011; 
Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). The contribution of this study to the existing literature 
on the certification effect of R&D grants is twofold. First, while prior studies examined 
whether the receipt of R&D subsidies increases a firm’s ability to raise debt levels, this study 
is the first to investigate the impact on the cost of debt. Second, scholars generally attribute 
the effect to quality signaling, albeit only few attempts have been made to identify multiple 
effects of obtaining public support on external financing. In principle, two other possible 
mechanisms may explain improved access to financing in addition to a certification effect. On 
the one hand, resource effects – in the sense that the subsidy serves as a liquidity shock and 
hence reduces the need to raise debt (or the amount required) and increases lenders’ 
confidence in a firm’s financial situation – may ease access to and lower the cost of debt. On 
the other hand, a formation effect – in which applicants learn from the application procedure 
in terms of preparing a decent R&D project proposal – may affect lenders’ decision to provide 
funding.       
The results show that obtaining a grant is indeed negatively associated with firms’ average 
debt charges. For young firms, the effect predominantly stems especially from subsidies for 
basic research, the stage of the R&D process where information asymmetries are typically 
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larger. The magnitude of the received amount, however, does not explain this effect, which 
points to a minor importance of a resource effect. Thus, we conclude that this result mainly 
stems from a process of certification in which the subsidy signals the quality of the firms’ 
R&D to external investors, thereby also reducing the screening costs of the debt provider. In 
addition, young firms seem to benefit from a ‘formation effect’. For them a grant application 
is related to lower average debt charges, independent of whether the application was granted 
or not, whereas for more established firms grant success matters. Application experience may 
help especially younger firms to prepare better research project plans, e.g., descriptions that 
lay out the commercialization or valorization potential more convincingly. Thus, experience 
with evaluations of their R&D plans can generate a “preparation premium” when applying for 
a loan and when subsequently negotiating the cost of debt.  
As R&D-intensive young firms are important for a region’s economic growth, the findings of 
this paper provide policy makers with an additional rationale for granting R&D subsidies to 
financially constrained firms with the aim to foster private R&D projects. However, the R&D 
subsidy assignment policy has to be set up appropriately, in a manner that makes sure that the 
screening process a firm has to go through when applying for an R&D grant is indeed 
selective and based on quality criteria and not, for instance, on sector quotas. In this way, 
subsidies could have a supplementary function on firms’ ability to execute risky but 
promising research projects by improving their access to external financing and decreasing 
their external capital cost. In addition, the screening process could also assist young firms in 
critically reflecting on their own projects, thereby preparing them to apply for funding at other 
financiers. 
Despite the comprehensive analysis, this study is not without limitations. Although banks 
attach less importance to the entrepreneur compared to other funding providers such as 
business angels (Mason and Stark, 2004) and we do account for firm performance which has 
been shown to be strongly related to human capital and managerial competencies (see e.g., 
Haber and Reichel, 2007), we cannot control for management quality or other entrepreneur-
specific factors that are unobserved but time-variant. Second, the data does not allow us to 
distinguish between the cost of debt of short-term versus long-term loans. If R&D activities 
were mainly financed through short-term debt due to the risky nature of the projects, it would 
be interesting to test whether it is mainly short-term or long-term interest rates that are 
affected by an R&D grant receipt. Finally, we suggest further research on the dynamics 
between subsidy program participation and firms’ cost of debt using actual loan request data. 
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Linking the grant application or receipt to specific loan requests and decisions would be 
highly desirable and could serve as a test of our results based on rather aggregate information.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Overview of the full IWT dataset on R&D grants (1999–2011) 
Year Application 
count 
Rejected 
application 
count 
Subsidy count Basic 
research 
subsidy count 
Mixed R&D 
subsidy count 
Development 
subsidy count 
1999 334 61 273 50 164 59 
2000 221 18 203 64 98 41 
2001 257 45 212 72 82 58 
2002 426 83 343 129 95 119 
2003 504 116 388 133 95 160 
2004 474 69 405 153 80 172 
2005 514 127 387 153 55 179 
2006 515 136 379 155 63 161 
2007 507 117 390 143 89 158 
2008 495 121 374 188 33 153 
2009 746 223 523 243 71 209 
2010 741 246 495 201 80 214 
2011 585 191 394 148 88 158 
TOTAL 6319 (100%) 1553 (24.6%) 4766 (75.4%) 1832 1093 1841 
 
Table 2: Distribution of firms across industries (final sample) 
 NACE revision 2008 Description # of firms # of subsidy 
applications 
Grant rate 
1 1, 3, 10, 11, 12 Food, tobacco and 
agriculture 
570 37 0.892 
2 13, 14, 15 Textile, clothing and leather 267 38 0.711 
3 16, 17, 18 Wood, paper and publishing 223 7 0.857 
4 19, 20, 21, 22 Chemicals and plastics 678 97 0.866 
5 24, 25 Metal 420 69 0.884 
6 26, 27 ICT/Electronics 271 238 0.870 
7 28, 29, 30 Machinery and vehicles 494 95 0.895 
8 5-9, 23, 31-40 Other manufacturing 
industries 
582 48 0.958 
9 41, 42, 43 Construction 285 12 0.667 
10 45, 46, 47 Trade 810 22 0.864 
11 49-53, 58, 64, 65, 66 Transport, financial service 
and press 
411 6 0.667 
12 61, 62, 63, 71, 72 ICT services and R&D 447 92 0.793 
13 55, 59, 60, 68, 69, 70, 73, 
74, 75, 77-99 
Other services 338 19 0.789 
#   5796 780 0.856 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of subsidy applicants and subsidized firms (final sample) 
Variable N..    Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SUBSIDY APPLICANTS 
subsidy dummyt-1 461 0.879 0.327 0 1 
basic subsidy dummyt-1 461 0.291 0.455 0 1 
mixed subsidy dummyt-1 461 0.351 0.478 0 1 
development subsidy dummyt-1 461 0.412 0.493 0 1 
rejected subsidy dummyt-1 461 0.213 0.410 0 1 
SUBSIDIZED FIRMS 
subsidy ratet-1 405 0.417 0.111 0.222 0.75 
basic subsidy ratet-1 134 0.525 0.102 0.200 0.75 
mixed subsidy ratet-1 162 0.434 0.089 0.250 0.611 
development subsidy ratet-1 190 0.336 0.074 0.250 0.55 
 
Table 4: Distribution of first-time applications across years (final sample) 
Year # of first time 
applications 
# of subsidy 
applications 
Share of first time 
applications 
2000 9 44 0.205 
2001 7 35 0.200 
2002 8 31 0.258 
2003 12 54 0.222 
2004 9 71 0.127 
2005 12 75 0.160 
2006 6 67 0.090 
2007 10 66 0.152 
2008 3 54 0.056 
2009 6 63 0.095 
2010 9 67 0.134 
2011 21 93 0.226 
2012 3 60 0.050 
# 115 780 0.147 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics (final sample, N = 5796) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
cost of debtt 0.012 0.010 0.011 0 0.050 
change in debtt (dummy) 
(*)
 0.379 0 0.485 0 1 
SUBSIDY INDICATORS 
subsidy ratet-1 0.029 0 0.110 0 0.75 
basic subsidy ratet-1 0.012 0 0.080 0 0.75 
mixed subsidy ratet-1 0.012 0 0.073 0 0.611 
development subsidy ratet-1 0.011 0 0.061 0 0.55 
subsidy dummyt-1 0.070 0 0.255 0 1 
subsidy countt-1 0.115 0 0.602 0 12 
(subsidy amount/total assets)t-1 0.001 0 0.011 0 0.465 
rejected dummyt-1 0.017 0 0.129 0 1 
application countt-1 0.135 0 0.668 0 12 
grant ratet-1  0.067 0 0.248 0 1 
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) 0.029 0 0.087 0 0.625 
past subsidy dummy(t-2)-(t-3) 0.122 0 0.328 0 1 
past application dummy(t-2)-(t-3) 0.129 0 0.335 0 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
R&D expenditures per emplt  5163 284 13940 0 135812 
patent stockt-1 1.171 0 6.213 0 106.304 
(cash flow/total assets)t-1 0.094 0.087 0.095 -0.488 0.489 
liquidityt 1.777 1.376 1.480 0.005 20.251 
(short-term debt/total assets)t 0.106 0.057 0.122 0 0.607 
(long-term debt/total assets)t 0.142 0.088 0.162 0 0.847 
(short-term debt/total assets)t-1 
(*)
 0.111 0.066 0.123 0 0.925 
(long-term debt/total assets)t-1 
(*)
 0.152 0.101 0.164 0 0.940 
aget 29.459 24 19.419 2 141 
emplt 235.377 80.900 612.999 1 9726 
Note: (*) based on 5,344 observations. 
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Table 6: Fixed effects regressions – Impact of general R&D subsidy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 cost of debtt cost of debtt cost of debtt 
subsidy ratet-1 -0.202**   
 (0.093)   
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) -0.183   
 (0.161)   
subsidy dummyt-1  -0.077*  
  (0.041)  
past subsidy dummy(t-2)-(t-3)  -0.040  
  (0.038)  
subsidy countt-1   -0.038** 
   (0.019) 
past subsidy count(t-2)-(t-3)   -0.025 
   (0.020) 
rejected dummyt-1 -0.047 -0.048 -0.038 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 -1.090*** -1.090*** -1.090*** 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) 
liquidityt -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
(short-term debt/total assets)t 2.400*** 2.400*** 2.400*** 
 (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) 
(long-term debt/total assets)t 2.940*** 2.940*** 2.940*** 
 (0.219) (0.219) (0.219) 
aget -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ln(empl)t 0.347** 0.347** 0.349** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) 
ln(empl)²t -0.027* -0.027* -0.028* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
N 5796 5796 5796 
R2 overall 0.386 0.386 0.385 
F 33.37*** 32.99*** 32.82*** 
Test on joint significance of time 
dummies 
13.10*** 13.15*** 13.27*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and year dummies not presented and coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Fixed effects regressions – Testing for the resource effect 
 (1) (2) 
 cost of debtt cost of debtt 
subsidy ratet-1 -0.209**  
 (0.094)  
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) -0.184  
 (0.161)  
subsidy dummyt-1  -0.078* 
  (0.042) 
past subsidy dummy(t-2)-(t-3)  -0.040 
  (0.038) 
(subsidy amount/total assets)t-1  0.168 0.066 
 (0.691) (0.709) 
rejected dummyt-1 -0.047 -0.048 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.034 0.034 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 -1.090*** -1.090*** 
 (0.168) (0.169) 
liquidityt -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
(short-term debt/total assets)t 2.400*** 2.400*** 
 (0.197) (0.197) 
(long-term debt/total assets)t 2.940*** 2.940*** 
 (0.219) (0.219) 
aget -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
ln(empl)t 0.347** 0.347** 
 (0.158) (0.157) 
ln(empl)²t -0.027* -0.027* 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
N 5796 5796 
R2 overall 0.386 0.386 
F 32.11*** 31.68*** 
Test on joint significance of time 
dummies 
13.10*** 13.15*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and year dummies not presented and coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Fixed effects regressions – Testing for the formation effect 
 Young firms Established firms 
 (1) cost of debtt (2) cost of debtt (3) cost of debtt (4) cost of debtt 
application countt-1 -0.082**  0.035  
 (0.033)  (0.022)  
grant ratet-1 0.033  -0.143**  
 (0.059)  (0.064)  
past application dummyt-1 0.009  -0.068  
 (0.055)  (0.053)  
subsidy ratet-1  -0.240*  -0.212 
  (0.126)  (0.134) 
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3)  -0.084  -0.404 
  (0.210)  (0.251) 
rejected dummyt-1  -0.211**  0.117 
  (0.091)  (0.095) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.057 0.059 0.008 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.022) (0.023) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 -1.370*** -1.370*** -0.780*** -0.779*** 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.200) (0.200) 
liquidityt -0.047** -0.046** -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
(short-term debt/total assets)t 2.390*** 2.410*** 2.360*** 2.360*** 
 (0.334) (0.331) (0.259) (0.259) 
(long-term debt/total assets)t 2.260*** 2.280*** 3.340*** 3.340*** 
 (0.338) (0.339) (0.274) (0.272) 
aget -0.027** -0.027** -0.014* -0.015* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
ln(empl)t 0.681*** 0.674*** -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.215) (0.214) (0.149) (0.151) 
ln(empl)²t -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
N 2719 2719 2938 2938 
R2 overall 0.395 0.395 0.468 0.464 
F 15.96*** 16.09*** 17.76*** 16.72*** 
Test on joint significance of time 
dummies 
5.93*** 5.72*** 8.24*** 8.10*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and year dummies not presented and coefficients are multiplied by 100.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Fixed effects regressions – Different subsidy types 
 Young firms Established firms 
 (1) cost of debtt (2) cost of debtt 
basic subsidy ratet-1 -0.216** -0.024 
 (0.104) (0.181) 
mixed subsidy ratet-1 -0.053 -0.388* 
 (0.238) (0.217) 
development subsidy ratet-1 -0.213 -0.179 
 (0.194) (0.193) 
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) -0.059 -0.354 
 (0.216) (0.240) 
rejected dummyt-1 -0.209** 0.126 
 (0.090) (0.094) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.005** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.058 0.008 
 (0.041) (0.023) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 -1.360*** -0.775*** 
 (0.269) (0.199) 
liquidityt -0.046** -0.031 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
(short-term debt/total assets)t 2.410*** 2.360*** 
 (0.331) (0.256) 
(long-term debt/total assets)t 2.280*** 3.340*** 
 (0.339) (0.271) 
aget -0.027** -0.015* 
 (0.013) (0.008) 
ln(empl)t 0.672*** -0.020 
 (0.215) (0.149) 
ln(empl)²t -0.053*** -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
N 2719 2938 
R2 overall 0.396 0.460 
F 14.98*** 15.68*** 
Test on joint signif. of time 
dummies 
5.76*** 8.03*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and year dummies not presented and coefficients  
are multiplied by 100.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Random effects probit regression – Impact of R&D subsidies on access to debt 
 change in debtt 
subsidy ratet-1 0.387** 
 (0.195) 
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) -0.018 
 (0.265) 
rejected dummyt-1 0.143 
 (0.155) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.0001 
 (0.002) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.012 
 (0.011) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 -0.507** 
 (0.234) 
liquidityt -0.168*** 
 (0.020) 
(short-term debt/total assets)t-1 -0.033 
 (0.195) 
(long-term debt/total assets)t-1 -0.266* 
 (0.139) 
aget 0.0004 
 (0.001) 
ln(empl)t 0.177** 
 (0.082) 
ln(empl)²t -0.017* 
 (0.009) 
N 5344 
Log likelihood -3395.36 
Wald chi2(36) 168.92 
Sigma_u 0.476 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies 15.43*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 51.49*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Constant, sector and year dummies not presented. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Fixed effects regressions – Impact of the financial crisis  
 cost of debtt 
subsidy ratet-1 -0.268*** 
 (0.103) 
subsidy ratet-1 * YD2008 0.134 
 (0.243) 
subsidy ratet-1 * YD2009 0.352 
 (0.308) 
subsidy ratet-1 * YD2010 0.270 
 (0.303) 
past subsidy rate(t-2)-(t-3) -0.183 
 (0.161) 
rejected dummyt-1 -0.049 
 (0.072) 
  
(Other control variables have same effect as in 
Table 6) 
 
  
N 5796 
R2 overall 0.383 
F 30.27*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 12.76*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Only main variables presented and coefficients  
are multiplied by 100.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 12a: Probit regression on likelihood of receiving an R&D grant 
 subsidy dummyt-1 
past application dummy(t-2)-(t-3) 0.529*** 
 (0.104) 
R&D expenditures per emplt 0.013*** 
 (0.003) 
ln(patent stock)t-1 0.066*** 
 (0.019) 
cooperation dummy(t-1) 0.559*** 
 (0.095) 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 1.042** 
 (0.460) 
liquidityt -0.022 
 (0.035) 
(debt/total assets)t-1 0.104 
 (0.232) 
aget 0.003 
 (0.002) 
ln(empl)t -0.096 
 (0.145) 
ln(empl)²t 0.017 
 (0.016) 
N 3450 
Pseudo R² 0.302 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies 33.99*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 34.13*** 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Constant, industry and year dummies not presented. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12b: Matching results NNPM (treatment = R&D subsidy receipt) – Cost of debt 
 Control group of non-
subsidized firms (N = 283) 
Subsidized firms (N = 283) p-value of t-
test on mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.  
OUTCOME VARIABLE 
cost of debtt 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.069*(**) 
 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
past application dummy(t-2)-(t-3) 0.484 0.501 0.519 0.501 0.492 
R&D expenditures per emplt 21.977 31.169 21.879 28.160 0.975 
ln(patent stock)t-1 -1.348 3.279 -1.222 3.443 0.712 
cooperation dummyt-1 0.731 0.444 0.731 0.444 1.000 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 0.095 0.103 0.093 0.113 0.869 
liquidityt 1.879 1.370 1.739 1.411 0.325 
(debt/total assets)t-1 0.260 0.200 0.263 0.197 0.880 
aget 34.859 25.693 32.477 25.842 0.367 
ln(empl)t 5.106 1.477 5.177 1.541 0.642 
ln(empl)²t 28.240 15.559 29.169 16.280 0.567 
Note: Industry dummies are excluded from the table. The p-value is adjusted based on Lechner’s (2001) estimator for an asymptotic 
approximation of the standard errors (the significance level of the non-adjusted p-value in parentheses). 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 12c: Matching results NNPM (treatment = R&D subsidy receipt) – Access to debt 
 Control group of non-
subsidized firms (N = 283) 
Subsidized firms (N = 283) p-value of t-test 
on mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.  
OUTCOME VARIABLE 
change in debt dummyt 0.290 0.454 0.435 0.497 0.004*** 
 
PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
past application dummy(t-2)-(t-3) 0.481 0.501 0.519 0.501 0.475 
R&D expenditures per emplt 25.513 32.492 21.879 28.160 0.285 
ln(patent stock)t-1 -1.560 3.108 -1.222 3.443 0.333 
cooperation dummyt-1 0.749 0.434 0.731 0.444 0.710 
(cashflow/total assets)t-1 0.094 0.117 0.093 0.113 0.919 
liquidityt 1.872 1.274 1.739 1.411 0.352 
(debt/total assets)t-1 0.255 0.202 0.263 0.197 0.690 
aget 34.558 22.464 32.477 25.842 0.416 
ln(empl)t 4.974 1.381 5.177 1.541 0.191 
ln(empl)²t 26.636 14.168 29.169 16.280 0.116 
Note: Industry dummies are excluded from the table. The p-value is adjusted based on Lechner’s (2001) estimator for an asymptotic 
approximation of the standard errors. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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